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#### The aff’s reformation to the political economy can’t be separated from the narrative of neoliberal success. Unspoken, but ever present, is the appeal of the American Dream that entices and assimilates the most privileged Asian populations as junior partners to whiteness. As

Overall, in the pro-Liang mobilization, what might be read as a moment of acculturation, in which the Chinese American subject moves toward American cultural citizenship through civic participation and immersion in racial minority discourse, needs historical and transnational articulations. The American Dream is not just about crafting the American nation-state as an exceptional place upholding democracy and freedom; it is an imperialist ambition. These ideologies indeed travel across national borders as transnational capital moves through geopolitical spaces, demanding an open market and culturally equipped consumers, building a parasitic ideological relation between the two nations. The neoliberal form of the Asian American body politic is fused with the model minority ethics of hard work and deservingness, as well as anti-Blackness, and it treats any political outcry against racialized state violence as a performance of political correctness.**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

#### This parasitic citizenship required by appeals to economic freedom, competition, and the American Dream produces both inter and intramural violence for a taste of conditional freedom. The rampant nationalism spurred by Liang’s shooting of Gurley demonstrates how racial and political crises can be coopted for conservative means

Liu 18 (Wen, Assistant Professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at the University of Albany, “Complicity and Resistance: Asian American Body Politics in Black Lives Matter,” October 2018, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 21, Number 3)

This racial antagonism between Asian and African American communities, which resulted in accumulated transnational geopolitical conflicts, reached a peak in the aforementioned incident of Liang’s shooting and killing of Gurley in November 2014. This incident, occurring during the height of the BLM protests in Ferguson, became a controversy in the movement. The controversy was raised and then became a division between African and Asian Americans but also within Asian American communities because Liang, a young Chinese American man, was the first among all police officers indicted, the others all white, who had abused police powers in the line of duty resulting in the deaths of many unarmed and innocent Black people. It became apparent to Asian Americans that the government was using Liang as a scapegoat to try to alleviate the national racial “crisis” highlighted by BLM activists and their demands to reform and abolish the police system built on the practices and ideology of white supremacy. This targeting of an inexperienced Asian American officer offended many Chinese Americans. Within a few months of the incident, two large-scale rallies and several press conferences were mobilized in support of Liang by Chinese American business leaders and local politicians, who accused the city’s indictment of officer Liang as racist. This seemingly defensive mobilization against Liang’s indictment was quickly appropriated by conservative elites and politicians and turned into an offensive, anti-Black critique of BLM’s racial justice vision. I identified four distinct discursive strategies that the pro-Liang groups adopted to turn BLM’s critique of the state’s racism via police violence into racism against Chinese Americans: racial victimology, ethnic empowerment and deservingness, the American Dream, and anti-Blackness. These discursive strategies allowed the proLiang groups to shift the attention away from BLM’s broader demand for racial justice and toward intergroup Asian-Black conflicts. Racial Victimology The pro-Liang coalition mobilized Chinese immigrant communities not only in New York City and its surrounding suburbs but also transnationally. An online petition for the White House opposing Liang’s indictment started by a Chinese American community member quickly reached almost 120,000 signatures.27 Within a day of the announcement of the court, tens of thousands of dollars were donated to the campaign to withdraw Liang’s indictment from Chinese people of all classes—restaurant workers, beauticians in hair salons, business managers, lawyers, and retired elders, and so on.28 Meanwhile overseas, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central propaganda newspaper, People’s Daily, not only reported the incident but also condemned the U.S. government as “unjust” and argued that “the US legal system still has a long way to go,”29 implicating that the unequal treatment of Chinese Americans crushed the fantasy of egalitarian multiculturalism in the United States. Due to the wide-scale response and interests in the case, a self-proclaimed “civil rights” organization called Coalition of Asian American for Civil Rights (CAACR) was quickly formed after the incident. The coalition organizers, mostly Chinese American businessmen, saw this as a chance to inject rarely visible Asian American agendas into mainstream politics and strengthen the community’s ties with the police and the state. Thousands of Chinese American protestors gathered on the lawn of Cadman Plaza in Brooklyn, waving American flags and bilingual signs in support of Liang on April 26, 2015. The crowd largely consisted of middle-aged, first-generation Chinese Americans and their young children. Many people wore red clothes as a symbol of Chinese national pride. Although the event was set as a protest against the “unjust treatment” of the state and many were chanting “No Scapegoats!” along with the organizers on the stage, the tone of the event was strangely celebratory. Some families brought picnics and speakers to play Chinese music in the park, as if it was an extension of the Lunar New Year celebration that had happened earlier in the month. Due to the sheer amount of people present in the crowded space, it was difficult to hear the speeches from the politicians and business leaders on the main stage. The political content of the rally was not clear to me in the first place. My conversation with a Chinese woman in her thirties from a New Jersey suburb confirmed at least one segment of ambiguous political motivation of the participants, as she admitted that she wasn’t familiar with the details of the Liang-Gurley case. The reason she had decided to come was because a message in her WeChat group encouraged people to show up to demonstrate “Chinese unity.” The themes of Chinese unity and pride seemed collectively shared among the participants, who expressed a sense of urgency to show up and to “not get looked down on by the Americans,” in other words, the mainstream society that they felt had silenced their political views for too long. The reason that the mobilization was successful and effective should not be attributed to the significance of the Liang-Gurley case alone but be examined in the context of a cumulative organizing effort within Chinese communities. Several precursor events contributed to the turnout at Liang’s rallies. First, in October 2013, on the Jimmy Kimmel Live segment “Kids Table Government Shutdown Show,” ABC aired an episode in which four children were discussing how the United States should solve the problem of its massive national debt to China. One child suggested that the government should build a big wall, and another six-year-old child laughed and said, “kill everyone in China.”30 The remarks infuriated Chinese American communities, a group of whom sent a petition to the White House’s “We the People” online initiative to demand that the U.S. government investigate ABC’s racial hatred.31 It reached a hundred thousand signatures in the three weeks following the show’s airing. Although the White House used the argument of free speech to deflect the demand, a new online network of Chinese Americans was built and carried a sense of political purpose to challenge racism against Chinese communities in the United States and abroad, unaffiliated with the existing nonprofit structure of Asian American network formed after the civil rights movements, galvanizing a new Chinese American collective identity of racial victimhood.32 Second, this insurgent political consciousness of middle-aged Chinese Americans, traditionally thought of as silent in American mainstream politics, was mobilized due to their desire to preserve their children’s educational privileges in higher education, as many institutions now do not consider Asian American a protected racial category. A coalition of Asian American groups filed suits against Harvard and several other Ivy League universities in 2015 and 2016 regarding their racial quotas in admission processes.33 While progressive affirmative action activists have been adapting the category of Asian American to argue that not all Asian Americans fit into the high-achieving stereotype, especially when Pacific Islanders and Southeast Asian Americans are considered, the complaints around higher education admission from Chinese American communities in recent years are primarily based on the ideology of meritocracy regardless of one’s race. This demand is about eliminating the Asian racial category as a protected class that is no longer needed. A color-blind racial rhetoric packaged in discourses of rights and justice has emerged in conservative Chinese American communities. These two political mobilizations together became the background driving forces for a solidified Chinese American subjectivity in the Liang Gurley case, built upon a form of racial victimology. The Chinese protestors, particularly the leadership, called out the state’s scapegoating tactic against Liang and labeled the incident “racial discrimination,” “unfair treatment,” and “selective treatment,” as many white officers have killed innocent people and have not been charged with manslaughter. Signs depicting Martin Luther King and speeches about the killing of Vincent Chin in the 1980s were highlighted in the rallies in March and April 2015, each drawing thousands of Chinese American participants. Ethnic Empowerment and Deservingness Whereas the deaths of Gurley and many other Black victims of police violence were not fairly addressed by the state or mainstream media, many Chinese publications in the United States portrayed the Chinese American mobilization in a unilateral celebratory tone. World Journal and Sing Tao Daily called the pro-Liang movement, which started in New York and spread across major U.S. cities, a “historical” phenomenon and the “largest” Chinese American gathering in the United States, showing an “unprecedented unity” and “solidarity” as well as a “mature and rational” image of the community.34 The Asian American rhetoric from the civil rights movement was largely appropriated to manufacture a united front of the Chinese American body politic as racial victim and, again, a legible racial minority deserving of institutional access and apology. This celebratory narrative of the newly emerged Chinese American “political unity” quickly became a political opportunity for Chinese elites to form a “rainbow coalition” with local Republican politicians, Asian and white, seizing the moment to condemn the current Democratic government and form stronger ties with the city’s police department. For instance, Joseph Concannon, a white retired NYPD captain, failed Senate and city council candidate, and president of the Tea Party–aligned Queens Village Republican Club, was a major force behind the pro-Liang rallies. Concannon, along with other Chinese American Republicans including Phil Grim and Doug Lee as well as qiaoling (僑領), overseas Chinese business leaders, worked together to push for their antipolice reform agendas as means to not only undermine the government of the more liberal-leaning mayor Bill de Blasio but also unite Asian American voters for the upcoming local elections, as voter registration forms passed through the rally crowd. In the March 9, 2015, “Support Your Local Police” rally to protest the indictment of Liang, Concannon implicitly condemned BLM activists as “racial arsonists” and “professional agitators” who were “turned loose” under de Blasio’s leadership.35 He and other Republican politicians addressed the Chinese American community as the “natural ally” for the pro-police and conservative agendas. A right-wing alliance developed between conservative Chinese and white Americans, who share a deep investment in preserving class privileges and status, in the name of “racial justice.” Far from being cross-racial solidarity, this alliance is white assimilation in disguise. Although securing Asian American voter blocks seemed to be the rainbow coalition’s primary motive in participating in the pro-Liang rally, for many of the Chinese American participants, it was a rare opportunity to express pride in their long-overlooked ethnic and national identity. This intensified sentiment of Chinese nationalism became salient to me in the rally on April 26. Whereas the coalition leadership was drawing from a more multicultural, pan-Asian discourse to put forth their demands to drop Liang’s charges, the conversations I had with the participants emphasized that Chinese people should stand up for themselves and not to get “harassed” or “put down by the Americans” anymore—meaning not only the white Americans who occupy a superior position in society but also other racial minorities, particular Blacks, whose demands seem to be taken more seriously by the state. The Liang incident becomes another classic example of how Asian Americanness is lifted up to perpetuate model minority success in order to deny the institutional access of other marginalized racial subjects such as in the affirmative action debate. It is ironic that the coalition leadership monopolized the representation of “Asian Americans” as a way to reappropriate the current racial crisis for ethnic-nationalist concerns, as the coalition was composed of only Chinese American and white leaders. The discourse of Asian racial victimology was mostly present in the official rhetoric of the Chinese American leaders, but to the participants, especially for the first-generation immigrants, it was more of an issue about Chineseness. Their urgency to stand up and join the rally was to express political power as a people to the American public after decades of being silenced as a racialized population. The American Dream The discourses of the American Dream were everywhere in the pro-Liang rallies. Chinese American families waved American flags while marching across the Brooklyn Bridge on April 26, 2015. The American anthem played before the speeches. Interestingly, the participants, who were largely native Chinese speakers, seemed uninterested in the American anthem, and hardly anyone sang along. Most of the participants, Chinese families with young children, gathered in small groups to take pictures with the American flags given to them by the coalition leaders. Any pedestrian who just happened to walk by that day would have had difficulty recognizing this gathering as a “political protest,” as many participants treated the event more like a social celebration. Some participants were waving heart-shaped signs with the Chinese letter “love” (愛) in red along with the American flags. A thick, impenetrable, and totalizing force of Chinese nationalism was forged during the event. The collective political narrative of Chinese ethnic empowerment superseded the more nuanced ways the participants understood the Liang-Gurley incident. At one point the redness of the American flags and the redness from the participants’ signs, clothes, and banners, which symbolized Chinese unity, merged in the scene. It became clearer and clearer to me, as I marched “ethnographically” with the crowd, that the American Dream was aligned with an equally powerful, affective Chinese Dream and a neoliberal transnational dream of class advancement that requires exclusion and stratification of the classed and racial Other. As a queer Taiwanese American observer in the march, my otherness was indeed quite apparent. Despite being ethnically Han, my queerness and nonconforming gender expressions drastically singled me out from the crowd of middle-aged parents and their young children. When I spoke to the march participants, my Taiwanese Mandarin accent was also quite distinct from that of the Chinese mainlanders. I felt as though I was a “race traitor” and consciously distanced myself from the crowd so that they would not recognize my ulterior emotions. At the same time, I recognized the very flexible capacity of my Asian Americanness that blended in the collective expression of Chinese American body politic to the non-Chinese spectators, yet my queerness continued to signify a stance of dissidence and protest—an opposition to the American and the Chinese ideal. However, without the presence of other dissidents, my race and ethnicity were quickly absorbed and territorialized by the collective body politic in the event—the ambiguous yet powerful signs of Chineseness, masking in total consensus by the bodies, the chants, the redness everywhere on participants’ signs, banners, and clothes. The collective political narrative of Chinese ethnic empowerment supersedes the more nuanced ways the participants understood the Liang-Gurley incident. The U.S. flag in the event symbolized not only allegiance to the state but an aspiration to become successful as Chinese people in the United States. During my fieldwork on the bridge, another middle-aged Chinese woman told me that she had brought her son to the rally because she wanted him to “learn democracy” in order to be “successful in this country.” As much of the Chinese press that covered the pro-Liang mobilization as a historical event has shown Chinese solidarity and Chinese people’s capacity to participate in civic actions in a “mature and rational” manner,36 the subjectivity that emerged in these events was less about a demonstration of American patriotism and more about Chinese modernity and desire for a new nation as a people. As the previous Asian American assimilationist politics in the post–civil rights period emphasized American national and cultural identity, that is, a liberal racial ideology of national belonging, the pro-Liang coalition expressed a qualitatively different kind of national belonging grounded in a moral and cultural ethic of economic advancement and civic respectability, as well as in a dream of Chinese modernity. Aihwa Ong has defined neoliberalism as a technology of governance that rearticulates the social criteria for citizenship for the purpose of optimizing the effects of the market and demoralizing economic activities.37 Citizenship is thus no longer strictly attached to national identification but defined by economic productivity. In short, the participants’ desire for U.S. nationalism is less about being seen as “Americans” and more about a longing for continual economic prosperity and political opportunities for their communities and their next generations. Similarly, the discourse around Liang’s “unfair” indictment focused not on his unequal treatment as an “American” but on how the promise of model minority advancement was temporarily shattered by a state-inflicted racial crisis.

#### Asian Americans are at a political crossroad. Historically apathetic, the new waves of Anti-Asian violence have created new waves of political hope and energy for Asian communities. BUT that political hope is not neutral – central to the appeal to assimilation is also the appeal to reinforce the systems of militarism and violence that have torn our communities apart. From Asian Americans donating nearly $100,000 to the Proud Boys after the capital riots[[2]](#footnote-2) to supporting affirmative action lawsuits,[[3]](#footnote-3) the chase for the “good Asian American Life” AND the fear of being the perpetual foreigner constitutes a wounded attachment that demands permanent hierarchies.

#### Retrofitting one’s subjecthood around economic competitiveness and proving economic value creates this nationalistic identification in hopes of assimilation. However, “Assimilation must not be mistaken for power, because once you have acquired power, you are exposed, and your model minority qualifications that helped you in the past can be used against you, since you are no longer invisible”[[4]](#footnote-4)

-Cathy Park Hong: Minor Feelings

Ironside 11 (Emily Rae Ironside, MA in Communication, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville,

(Re)Constituting the Immigrant Body through Policy: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Narratives within the Discourses of the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Communication, <https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=etd&httpsredir=1&referer=>)

Using exclusionary nationalist discourses of assimilationism to reframe marginalized immigrants as Americans rather than enemies of the state creates a rhetorical tension through which DREAM Act supporters must cautiously navigate. Although the familiar theme of assimilation creates ethos and closes the gaps privileging “Americans” over immigrant “Others,” it also reifies their own their subordination by preserving the dominance of exclusionary nationalism. Feminist scholar Audre Lorde speaks to marginalized black feminists attempting to eradicate racism within White feminist discourse, arguing that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”312 Lorde’s warning applies to all subordinated groups who use dominant, elitist discourse to bring about genuine social change. She argues its very usage reinforces “the master’s” position of power and prevents social transformation; therefore, subordinated immigrants who wish to challenge their position of powerlessness and encourage longterm social change should understand the rhetorical consequences of reenacting the discourses of exclusionary nationalism. Using assimilationist discourses to persuade policymakers to expand the definition of American to include immigrant “Others” ultimately fails to destroy the institutionalized dominance of the exclusive national narrative responsible for their exclusion. In order to challenge the state’s control over the American identity, undocumented immigrants and their allies must master the art of difference and redefine themselves outside of the dominant exclusionary nationalist discourses. In addition to employing exclusionary nationalist discourses of assimilation to persuade policymakers to pass the DREAM Act, the panelists speaking in the 2007 hearing upheld the classist rhetoric of economic competition, constructing themselves as valuable assets to the American economy. They took on the myth of American exceptionalism as their own, claiming that they are the key to maintaining the economic power of the United States as global competition increases. Although this rhetorical strategy challenges the notion that undocumented immigrants are potential terrorists, it ultimately constitutes them as economic pawns of the state, further reducing the possibility for long-term social change that liberates undocumented immigrants from their marginalized position. The following section investigates how class-driven testimonies reinforce the dominant narrative of exclusionary nationalism and perpetuate the economic subordination of undocumented immigrants. “We Are the American Dream”: The Conundrum of Classist Discourses The panelists speaking in support of the DREAM Act in the 2007 hearing strategically used classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism to construct undocumented immigrant youth as economic necessities. Historically, the notion of economic competition has been used to label unwanted immigrants as competitors who threaten the financial security of the nation and, therefore, endanger the livelihood of its citizens. Immigration policies such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the mass deportation of Mexican laborers in the 1930’s, and the seizure of property of interned Japanese in the 1940’s all were the result of widespread fears unwanted immigrants were stealing American jobs and threatening the national economy. In the case of the 2007 hearing on the DREAM Act, supporters utilized classist discourses of economic competition by constructing undocumented immigrant youth as valuable assets whose skills and determination will improve the economy, labeling those who deny legal access to these young workers are the new economic threat. Unfortunately, this rhetorical strategy did nothing to challenge exclusionary nationalism and, as a result, perpetuated the reduction of immigrants as laborers serving the state’s economic interests. Classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism constructed undocumented youth as a necessary investment in the nation’s economy. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, a panelist representing the Center for Employment Policy, stated of undocumented students, They are hardworking and talented, and produce streams of income taxes and Social Security payments that bolster our fiscal position. . . . This total of about 1 million potential workers represents .7 percent, less than 1 percent of our labor force . . . even though these undocumented young people are a small group, they have the potential to make an important contribution to our economy. . . . This makes the educational investment worth it both for the students, but more importantly for the rest of us. . . . because we have more productive citizens who fill needed job openings and who can pay taxes. . . . the United States needs these young workers.313 Contrary to the dominant classist discourses blaming the immigrant “invasion” for “[displacing] Americans from jobs” and “[placing]” heavy burdens” on the economy, Furchtgott-Roth constituted immigrant youth as outstanding entrepreneurs who will fill needed job openings and contribute to the strength of the American economy.314 Additionally, Furchtgott-Roth used statistics from a 2005 Harvard University study to argue that immigrants actually help raise average American wages by 0.1%, demonstrating how increasing access to employment for immigrants would not have the negative impact suggested by opponents of the DREAM Act. Although Furchtgott-Roth’s testimony challenged the conventional rhetoric that frames immigrant laborers as economic threats, it reinforced the classist construction of immigrants as token laborers needed for the economic prosperity of the White nation. Moreover, her “expert” testimony delegitimized the witnesses testifying before her. Rhetoricians Lorraine Higgins and Lisa Brush argue that marginalized “Others” “rarely constitute a public perceived as capable or ‘expert’ enough to contribute anything valuable to public debate.”315 By inviting “expert” witnesses representing the “master’s language” to speak after the immigrant “Others,” policymakers reduced the rhetorical power of the immigrant women and their personal narratives. Supporters of the DREAM Act perpetuated the myth of American exceptionalism, thereby maintaining the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism. The “expert” panelists in the 2007 hearing reinforced classist discourses when they portrayed immigrant youth as contributors to the myth of American exceptionalism. For example, Mr. Jamie Merisotis of the Institute for Higher Education Policy commented, If you consider what our national workforce needs are in the specific sense of human capital, it is clear we are looking at an enormous shortage of educated workers in the not-too-distant future. . . . Investing in those who are already here is our best hope for remaining competitive on a global scale. . . . The DREAM Act is a common-sense piece of bipartisan legislation that provides these talented and industrious future workers a pathway to citizenship.316 Additionally, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) argued, Our Nation is faced with ever increasing economic competition from developed and developing nations. To effectively compete in an ever expanding global market, we must ensure that we can continue to have the most educated workforce in the world. Whether in college or in the military, we must give all qualified young people the opportunity to contribute in ways that will keep America strong.317 Both Merisotis and Lofgren drew on the myth of maintaining American exceptionalism to support the passage of the DREAM Act. They legitimated the rhetorical constructs connecting economic status to national strength, claiming the key to keeping “America strong” is to invest in undocumented immigrant youth. By doing so, they objectified immigrants as being “human capital” only needed for the economic benefit of the state. Additionally, Merisotis and Lofgren preserved the notion that uneducated immigrants remain a danger to society when they suggested that only educated immigrants would benefit the U.S. economy. Just as policymakers excluded “unskilled” and “illiterate” immigrants from participating in the national narrative in 1917 through the implementation of illiteracy tests, Merisotis and Lofgren reserved access to the American identity for only educated, skilled undocumented immigrants.318 Using classist discourses of exclusionary nationalism, policymakers framed skilled undocumented immigrant youth as integral parts of the capitalist machine rather than as humans who deserve equal access to economic and social privilege. As Foucault reminds us, a primary way in which the state preserves its position of power is to render its people objects of its control. He argues that the state views the body as a “docile that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” for the purpose of stripping it of its individual force of power and transforming it into an “aptitude” or “capacity” of the state.319 Labeling immigrants as “human capital” reinforces their powerless position as docile and utilitarian objects, reducing immigrants to economic pawns needed to uphold the power of the state. Thus, the rhetorical strategy of framing undocumented immigrant youth as economic contributors fails to challenge the economic, racial, and social hierarchies of power and severely limits the passage of future policy benefiting the economic status of all marginalized immigrants, especially those immigrants furthest away from the status quo.320 Not only did the use of assimilationist and classist discourses fail to contest the narrative dominance of exclusionary nationalism, this strategy also restricted the ability for immigrants to resist mechanisms of state control. In the 2007 hearing, supporters of the DREAM Act utilized discourses of fear to highlight the injustices of detaining and deporting undocumented youth. They described the pain and anxiety resulting from the fear of deportation and family separation, making known the experiences of those living in the shadows cast by restrictive immigration policies. However, these panelists had previously stated their desire to become staunch members of the same society responsible for their fear; therefore, their testimonies lacked the rhetorical power needed to overturn centuries of state control. The following section investigates the strategic shortcomings of immigrant panelists who used discourses of fear to challenge mechanisms of internal enforcement.

#### US Antitrust isn’t a domestic attitude, it’s an international structure that coerces and condemns other nations into a continual state structural adjustment. Competition bleeds outward and mutates developing nations into a deformed image of Empire that will never be cared for.

Waked 16 (Dina I. Waked, Assistant Professor of Law at Sciences Po Law School, “Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges,” 2016, Journal of Law Economics and Policy, Vol. 12.2)

The unprecedented spread of antitrust laws in the 1990s raises the question of why did developing countries adopt competition laws in the 1990s and not before? Further, why did so many of them suddenly become interested in competition law adoption? There is no simple answer, except to say that competition laws were not considered an important addition to their arsenal of laws up until the 1990s. One reason was that many countries had provisions either in their penal codes, civil codes, or commercial legislations dealing with competition law issues before formally adopting legislation that is solely concerned with competition matters.8 This made them less interested in adopting particular laws dealing with competition, seeing that they had general provisions in other legislation dealing with the same issues. Then why did so many suddenly become interested in these kind of laws in the 1990s? It is simplistic to argue, yet probably true, that many countries were entering trade agreements in the 1990s that made the adoption of competition law a prerequisite to the implementation of the trade deals.9 These treaties were either trade agreements creating free trade zones or part of structural programs that intended to open up the developing world economies and facilitated the entry of foreign entities that considered a competition law a necessity and guarantee for their work abroad, in particularly in a developing country. More generally, the 1990s are considered the era where developing world countries started to put an end to their former protectionist policies that were either inspired by communist or socialist regimes or simply by efforts to industrialize and strengthen national champions and local producers. The 1990s introduced the new era of international trade, encouraging foreign direct investment, and membership in regional trade agreements or the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the emergence of many of these structural changes, open door policies and participation in world trade relations, competition laws were suddenly prescribed as necessities to fa-cilitate much of the impending changes.10 It is important to understand the role played by the WTO and other international organizations in encouraging and often requiring new members to adopt these laws in order to understand the surge in the developing world.11 Similarly, the role played by the EU in encouraging new members and trade partners to adopt competition law is even more straightforward.12 Adopting these laws seemed to many as the missing link to assure growth and development.13 Therefore, one could argue that one of the main factors that led to the widespread adoption of competition laws across developing countries is the push exercised by supranational bodies. Another factor is the overwhelming evidence these international bodies were presenting to developing countries illustrating a positive relationship between adopting a competition law and development. Competition laws appeared to be the missing link needed to usher in prosperity and growth. The pressure by international bodies and the development hopes that adopting competition laws carried are discussed in more detail next. A. The Push by International Bodies to Adopt Competition Laws International and supranational bodies have considered competition laws essential for economic reforms. Ever since competition laws were discussed as part of the agenda of the negotiations to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) after World War II, competition laws were considered a vital requirement for needed reforms. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) upheld the rhetoric of the ITO and included competition issues and restrictive business practices in a “best endeavor” clause.14 However, the GATT did not require the adoption of specific provisions dealing with the treatment of private restrictive business practices (RBPs).15 Therefore, the members of the WTO could freely adopt their own national competition laws so long as they did not infringe the principle of nondiscrimination.16 The General Council of the WTO created a Working Group in April 1997 on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy. This Working Group strongly called on developing countries to adopt competition rules in the face of the global merger wave underway and the structural changes taking place within the developing countries as a result of their liberalization and free trade policies.17 The WTO's focus on competition law adoption is due to the widely believed interaction between competition policies and the expansion of free trade.18 Effective free trade policies require, next to the withdrawal of trade barriers, the elimination of obstacles originating from private restraints resulting from abuse of dominance, monopolization, import and export cartels, horizontal and vertical restraints, and other issues considered to be competition law violations.19 To achieve these results, the WTO urged developing countries to adopt competition rules, often US or EC type competition policies, while encouraging for time lags in the introduction of these different aspects of competition rules to be able to efficiently implement them. One can explain the WTO’s continuous attempt to influence, encourage, and facilitate the adoption of competition legislation in developing countries by its aspirations towards harmonizing competition laws to one day usher in universal competition policies under its umbrella.20 The WTO is repeatedly encouraging agreements on core antitrust principles as a first step towards the achievement of this goal.21 When developing countries adopt rules similar to those in more developed countries, the attempt at harmonization seems more realistic and at the same time the effects of global anticompetitive conduct with relation to trade can be better tackled. If laws adopted in developing countries were fundamentally different from those in the advanced world, the ability of the developed countries to protect their interests from anti-competitive practices in developing countries would be limited. Thereby, not only would similar competition laws encourage more effective free trade, but would also give a sense of security for FDIs and MNCs working in developed countries. One can also argue that it would give the host developing country more teeth to prosecute prohibitive conduct emanating from local or foreign entities, and to challenge harmful global mergers. The WTO is not alone in encouraging competition law adoption across the developing world. Several international financial institutions consider a competition policy dimension when evaluating country risk necessary for lending purposes.22 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association (IDA) look at a country’s competition policy when assessing the situation of borrower countries before deciding to allocate the funds needed.23 A classic example is the case of Indonesia, where the country was required by the IMF to adopt a competition law in return for rescue money.24 It is worth noting that the first conditionality appeared in a World Bank industrial sector adjustment loan to Argentina in 1991.25Also, the United Nations and the OECD played a role in pushing for the adoption of competition laws across developing countries. Both institutions have adopted and promoted non-legally enforceable “codes of conduct” to prevent anticompetitive practices.26 The United Nations has also set up, under the rubric of the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United National Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), several projects and initiatives that assist developing countries in the design and implementation of their competition policies.27 The increased interest of international and supranational bodies with regard to encouraging adoption of competition laws in the developing world originated in the wave of neoliberal reforms as part of the Washington consensus, which resulted in privatization and liberalization across developing countries. Some of the goals of these reforms were to put an end to government monopolies and governmental intervention in the economy through liberalizations and privatizations. However, the result of the wave of privatization was that government monopolies were simply replaced by private monopolies yielding the same anti-competitive effects.28 For the past two decades or more, the World Bank Group and other development organizations have encouraged developing and emerging market economies to adopt pro-competition measures such as trade and investment liberalization, privatization, and economic deregulation. These initiatives have been aimed primarily at reducing public sector policy-based barriers to entry, regulatory costs, and delays that unnecessarily constrain private sector economic activity . . . . They are, however, insufficient— they are complementary to but do not substitute for an effective competition law-policy. They do not address the private sector restrictive business practices that can significantly impede competition. Unchecked, anticompetitive practices by dominant and politically connected firms and vested interest groups can capture or significantly reduce the benefits that accrue from competition . . . . Competition does not arise or sustain itself automatically. The competitive process needs to be maintained, protected, and promoted to strengthen the development of a sound market economy. 29 Similar rhetoric was reproduced over and over, not only by these international organizations, but also by lawyers, economists, and policy makers. The result was that adopting competition rules became a priority on the agenda of economic growth in many less developed countries, who pushed forward with the help or pressure of various supranational institutions. Some countries, however, resisted the push to adopt competition laws and continued to prefer concentration to competition. They, thereby, had less of a drive to adopt competition laws based on their own initiatives. Others felt the need to adopt competition laws and to drive their markets towards the perfect competition ideal. Part of this desire was their belief in the rhetoric presented to them, but also due to the increased cross-border influences of anti-competitive practices,30 especially their import of cartel-affected goods.31 Trading partners have also requested the adoption of antitrust laws as a condition for signing free trade agreements.32 For example, the EU has been extremely active in the process of spreading its competition law to developing countries. This is to the extent where “some argue that today the EC competition law is the dominant model of competition law in the world.”33 Treaties, such as the Accession Agreements signed by Eastern European countries to join the EU34 or the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements signed by various non-European Mediterranean countries and the EU, oblige the signatories to adopt competition laws modeled on Article 101 (formally 81) and 102 (formally 82) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).35 One of the studies on the adoption competition laws across countries suggests that “the impetus for adopting antitrust laws appears related to the imposed guidelines of supranational bodies, in particular the requirements of the European Union.”36 One reason why the EU has been actively involved in shaping the competition laws of developing countries could be the fact that the EU is an important trading partner and, therefore, it is eager to trade with countries that have similar laws. Another reason could be its race with the US on issues relating to harmonization of competition rules, whereby its influence on the competition laws of developing countries is an attempt to diffuse its laws, which could push the balance in its favor when negotiations on harmonized rules are underway. It is also worth noting that the EU is not the sole entity to require the adoption of competition laws in its bilateral trade agreements with developing countries. Many Free Trade Agreements have endorsed similar requirements, where parties to these agreements are required to have a domestic antitrust regime in place as one of the main conditions before entering into the agreement.37 Other bilateral and regional free trade agreements have also included chapters on competition policy.38 Finally, several nongovernmental organizations have also advocated the adoption of these laws and promoted assistance to countries in their implementation phases.39B. Development Hopes Associated with Adopting Competition Laws Development hopes have been crucial in the spread of competition laws. The direct impact of adopting competition laws on prosperity, economic growth, and development is often the reason furnished by these international institutions for developing countries to adopt these laws. The heightened interest in competition law adoption “suggests competition law is widely seen as a desirable and worthwhile economic policy.”40 Competition policy has often been regarded as a building block of economic development. A paper of the WTO Working Group described that: The specific benefits that have been attributed to such policy include promoting an efficient allocation of resources, preventing/addressing excessive concentration levels and resulting structural rigidities, addressing anti-competitive practices of enterprises . . . enhancing an economy’s ability to attract foreign investment and to maximize the benefits of such investment, reinforcing the benefits of privatization and regulatory reform initiating and establishing a focal point for the advocacy of pro-competitive reforms and a competition culture.41 The United Nations has also advocated, on many instances, that competition policy is a key ingredient for growth and development of nations.42 The same position has been taken by the OECD. One of its publications based on a survey of OECD members and non-members asserts that: There are strong links between competition policy and numerous basic pillars of economic development. . . . There is persuasive evidence from all over the world confirming that rising levels of competition have been unambiguously associated with increased economic growth, productivity, investment and increased average living standards.43 These kinds of assumptions are often backed by empirical studies showing that adopting competition laws lead to higher competition intensi-ties,44 which is automatically read to mean higher growth levels. The microeconomic fields of industrial organization and endogenous growth present ample material to show how competition is positively associated with growth. For example, one study argued that competition rules help sustain two of the fundamental ingredients of “economic growth: namely competitive markets and a sound legal system.”45 Another study stressed the fact that the adoption of competition policy is “positively correlated with the intensity of competition.”46 A further empirical study using multi-country regression analysis to explore the correlation between competition and growth rates found a “strong correlation between the effectiveness of competition policy and growth.”47 This study also illustrated that the effect of competition on growth is more than that of “trade liberalisation, institutional quality, and a general favourable policy environment.”48 This, however, was found to be predominantly true for Far Eastern countries and less so for other developing countries.49 Other proponents of the relationship between adopting competition laws and development argue that competition rules are a precondition to the implementation of successful privatization, especially if the goal of privatization is not the substitution of government monopolies by private ones.50 Similarly, another study concluded that liberalization alone does not lead to development since “non-tariff barriers to trade will replace tariffs that trade liberalization removes because of the political power of rent-seeking special interest groups.”51 Some also suggest that having competition legislation will deter corruption in transition economies, where “government bodies have tremendous power to affect the competitive process when they issue licenses, permits, franchises, and subsidies.”52 When these economies adopt competition laws some of the powers of government officials might be curbed and their responsiveness to bribes in order to facilitate illicit economic privileges might be reduced. This is assuming that the enforcers of the competition laws will not themselves be susceptible to bribes to avoid antitrust enforcement. Moreover, competition policy is considered essential for developing countries as a tool to increase foreign direct investment (FDI), which is considered essential for growth.53 Adopting antitrust laws creates a more transparent framework that increases investors’ reliance on the economy and reduces transaction costs.54 These are only some of the studies testing the relationship between competition law and development. It is important to note that most of the above-mentioned studies either test the correlation between adopting competition laws and development or between a proxy called “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy”55 and development. This is drastically different from studying the relationship between enforcing the competition laws and development. The latter should be the measure used to ascertain whether competition laws lead to development or not. Studying enforcement instead of adoption will not necessarily lead to the same conclusions. Regardless, developing countries have found the promises of development and growth associated with the adoption of competition laws too hard to ignore. International organizations and academic studies presenting the positive relationship between competition laws and development were made readily available to developing countries. The studies have shown persuasive conclusions that developing countries eagerly accepted. At the same time, these nations encountered numerous challenges, some structurally due their own positions as developing countries and some related to the discourse that competition laws lead to development and growth. Both of these challenges are discussed next. III. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: CHALLENGES TO ANTITRUST ADOPTION This section addresses some of the recurrent challenges articulated in adopting a competition law. Some of these challenges are due to the idiosyncratic nature of developing countries, yet others are more general critiques to the merits of competition laws. A. Limited Resources Need Not Be Wasted on a Costly Competition Regime Developing countries face numerous challenges with regard to adopting and enforcing competition rules. At the outset, enacting competition legislation was not always considered a priority on their reform agendas. This is due to the high costs and low returns associated with adopting these rules compared to other reform-oriented policies, such as removing trade restrictions. One of the common arguments is that trade liberalization yields far greater prosperity than adopting laws that attack restraints of trade. The advocates of trade liberalization, as a substitute for antitrust, argue that the mere removal of trade obstacles, such as tariffs and barriers to entry, will effectively discipline domestic producers in transition economies.56 They support the notion that “[f]ree trade is, consequently, the best antitrust policy.”57 Also, the argument that “[f]ree trade stimulates wealth creation and development, and in a small country it makes antitrust concerns largely irrelevant,”58 has been made to caution against adoption competition laws. Another argument in favor of trade liberalization is that the limited public resources of transition economies would produce better outcomes if invested in initiatives improving the flow of goods. For example, improvement in infrastructure would give consumers access to an increased number of sellers.59 Similarly, it is argued that economic policy and competition law enforcement divert the scarce resources away from more important priorities on the path to reform and development. The famous quote from one of the fierce opponents to imposing competition laws on transition economies, Paul Godek, is worth noting: “[e]xporting antitrust to Eastern Europe is like giving a silk tie to a starving man. It is superfluous; a starving man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is knotted too tightly, he will not be able to eat what little there is available to him.”60 B. Plenty of Reforms to Accommodate a Competition Enforcement Apparatus Are Needed Related to the criticism of spending scarce resources on adopting and enforcing competition laws is the claim that developing countries need also acquire, reform, or implement administrative apparatuses, effective judiciary and appeal systems, independent investigating authorities, and expertise.61 Most developing countries lack the aforementioned necessities to enforce antitrust laws. To improve the chances of effective antitrust implementation, developing countries need serious reforms in these areas. These are all costly endeavors that would deplete their resources further. In addition to these challenges, developing countries face further obstacles to competition enforcement due to the lack of data collection, which is especially necessary to define market shares. This is evident by the lack of effective “Statistics Offices” in public administrations that provide this information.62 The weakness of professional associations and consumer groups are also considered challenges that stand in the way of creating awareness and a competition culture that are essential to facilitate the smooth spread and implementation of these laws.63 Given these drawbacks in developing economies, what is ultimately feared is that the enforcement authority to be set up will not be able to apply the competition rules. It will lack the necessary funding, technical staff, and supporting environment to effectively enforce the law. It is also often argued, that in a developing country, an administrative body will often lack the necessary independence that is arguably critical for antitrust enforcement.64 C. Corruption, Government Intervention and Crony Capitalism Hamper Effective Competition Policy One of the critical challenges that face developing countries is the already high level of government interference in the economy, which is by default increased further when a competition law is adopted and enforced. The government intervention includes government-erected barriers to enter or exit the market,65 government monopolies, the various forms of subsidies granted by governments to loss-making enterprises,66 and government politicization of the administrative authorities in force of applying and enforcing the law. In most developing countries, governments play an active role in regulating and setting bureaucratic measures to be followed by firms to enter or exit the market, resulting in many instances in rigid barriers that cannot be surpassed. This in turn leads to rent-seeking behavior, cronyism, corruption, and favoritism.67 Adopting a competition law is arguably adding another layer of bureaucratic red tape that needs to be surpassed for firms to operate effectively. Similarly, this criticism amounts to the fear that competition policy will be a tool to provide disguised government control and hamper the growth of the often-fragile private sector. Developing countries also portray a unique political economy, where often government interests and those of the business elite are one and the same.68 This casts serious doubt on whether competition law enforcement will not be selectively used to create further obstacles to those players that are not part of this favored club. It may only entrench the powers of the incumbent firms and those that pay the highest rewards to the government apparatus.69 It is often argued that developing economies are enmeshed in a “Kafkaesque maze of control”70 where large family owners use their influence to limit competition and obtain finances from the government to alter the game in their favor.71 The poorly functioning capital markets in many developing countries furthers the concentrated ownership of the local elite even more. The fear is that incumbent firms use their rents to pay for such selective and biased enforcement, which can often not be matched by new entrants and small firms who want a piece of the pie.72 Incumbent firms want to maintain the status quo and resist any potential changes that might lower their influence and position in the market.73 Given this political economy “[a]ntitrust policies affected by political considerations may, however, come with a large price tag attached.”74 One of which is that “interest groups will follow their incentives and shift resources into monopolization through government protection. Lobbying the government for protection may be highly substitutable for organizing cartels.”75 In other words, producers and incumbents will now invest their rents in lobbying the government to continue their monopoly positions. Rodriguez and Williams argue that “the gain to interest groups of establishing cartels or price-fixing schemes are outweighed by simply soliciting preferential treatment from the state.”76 This implies that “antitrust may cause inefficiencies that are worse than the allocative losses that it is designed to defend against.”77 Such bureaucratic capture is assumed to make enforcers not able to serve the public interest.78 Nonetheless, arguments using interest group theory to qualify antitrust enforcement are not without their own critiques.79 Adding high levels of corruption to the mix, it is predictable that empowering the governments in developing countries with a competition law will lead to even more corruption spent to alter the game in the favor of the local elite and friends of the government at the expense of overall welfare. Such political and bureaucratic resistance is arguably among the main problems facing developing countries in terms of implementing their competition laws and creating a competition culture.8

#### Historic use of antitrust was signaled as the “cure-all” for an increasing racialized fear of communism in Asia and the Middle East. From Hayek’s preaching of the “competition ideal” to the amendment of the Clayton Act,[[5]](#footnote-5) antitrust was repurposed for combatting the growing Red and Yellow Scare. Even now, Biden preaches

Biden 21 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-an-executive-order-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

Let me close with this: Competition works. We know it works. We’ve seen it works when it exists. Fair competition is was what made America the wealthiest, most innovative nation in history. That’s why people come here to invent things and start new businesses. In the competition against China and other nations of the 21st century, let’s show that American democracy and the American people can truly outcompete anyone. Because I know that just given half a chance, the American people will never, ever, ever let their country down. Imagine if we give everyone a full and fair chance. That’s what this is all about. That’s what I’m about to do.

#### This is a new age of Yellow Peril. Paranoia has been sutured to the social and political that ignites Asian violence to fuel American exceptionalism. This establishes a positive feedback loop that proliferates orientalist tropes that conflates Yellow Peril as the pathological death knell to Whiteness.

Svetlicic 20 (Marjan Svetlitic, PhD Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, “From Red Scare to Yellow Peril; Reality and Fears of the Rise of China in a Historical Context,” Teorija in Praksa, Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Science, Vol. LVII, No. 1)

China appears to be the greatest challenge facing the world today. A strategic anxiety, the New China Scare, has surfaced. Such fears, almost rising to phobias, are not new. They have been seen regularly throughout history in various clothes whenever a power transition was underway. In more recent times, such fears started with the red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism. This was followed by European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of reconstruction after WW2. Later, in the late 1950, following the spectacular technological rise of Japan, the Yellow Peril emerged in the USA for the second time. Today we are encountering the third Yellow Peril – even though it originally started already at the mid19th in the USA as a fear of Chinese immigrants. Following 9/11, the obsession with terrorism commenced similarly to earlier anti-communist hysteria in the country. The Trump Administration has now started a trade war with China as part of the inward-looking economic and nationalist policies of America First. An opportunity has been created to replace America’s presence in the global arena as a consequence. It is not by chance that a trade war is brewing at a time when China is celebrating 40 years of being open to the world and becoming a leader in certain technologies. What is really underway is a technology war. After China’s spectacular growth, it is now time for states to begin thinking about what this actually means to each of them, what it means to their region, and to the world generally. Trump’s trade war against China may be seen as a way of rectifying some of the deficiencies of the existing Pax Americana. It is thus high time to reflect on whether China’s growth threatens the world’s development and stability (system) or is benefiting the partner countries. The awareness that China is not only a country with a big economy, but also one that has growing military strength coupled with geo-strategic ambitions, is making a difference in both real life and theory2. World power is obviously going back to Asia. The winners will be those able to take advantage of this (Prestowitz, 2005). According to Porter, “the biggest risk is not that China will succeed in rising to become an economic superpower. The biggest risk is that it will fail” (Porter, 2005). It is hence no surprise that China is increasingly seen as a threat. Paranoia has been carved into mind-sets not only for the country’s size, but also for the different Chinese civilisation which for the Western world is a strange combination of culture, a particular type of state-controlled economy and state socialism/communism. The purpose of this article is therefore to answer two research questions. First, are these fears justifiable or overblown, with concerns being based on the differences in the roots of civilisation, on cultural fears? Second, what are these differences, if any at all, and can we detect any similarities among them? The article is structured as follows. We first look at the theoretical framework of such challenges/fears, then consider each fear in chronological order in sections 2 and 3. The fourth section seeks to identify differences/ similarities while the last sections outlines some policy-related conclusions. Theoretical Framework The article addresses the manner in which views/perceptions3 of different global challenges have evolved in recent history. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates more on qualitative data and attitudes along with the context in which they are created because, as implied by Kant’s “transcendental idealism”, it is appearances and perceptions, not the reality that truly matters. In such qualitative analysis, social psychology is becoming ever more important. It sees challenges as a positive reaction to perceived fear4, regarded as one of the basic emotions. “The culture of fear5 of the other seems to be a forceful mechanism of social and political indoctrination for human beings« (Skoll and Korstanje, 2013). It has played and continues to play a central role in driving popular fears to make the masses do, or not do, what the elite desires. Especially in the twenty-first century, described as uncertain and unpredictable, risky VUCA (vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity), we seem to engage ever more frequently with various issues through a narrative of fear as a vital instrument of propaganda or, to borrow Bernays’ expression, engineering of consent (1969). People develop specific fears as a result of what they have learned, but the cause might also be an irrational, unconscious fear of the unknown6. Moreover, individual fears can grow into fears of a whole group or can as well arise from the fears held by a whole group usually manifested as stereotyping erroneously, of an entire nation. When problems mount in society, the specific cultural and historical context involved can fuel the stereotyping of entire nations as people look for the causes of such problems in others, in foreigners. They start to blame (scapegoat) them for job insecurity, problems with healthcare, low wages, the lack of safety nets etc. In a culture of fear, domestic frustrations are transferred to foreign enemies. A crisis is a typical example of when such prejudicial attitudes are created, although stereotypes can also be built to make it easier to process limited information and degrade others in order to magnify one’s own image. This phenomenon is more common when little is known about others or it is hard to learn about them due to being located far away (the distance factor). Such stereotypes impede our ability to objectively assess data/processes, assuming that stereotypes, presenting different picture, are believed to be true. Our readiness and ability to think critically and predict the behaviour of others is thereby weakened. All of these elements are visible in all the perils we analyse here, particularly in the yellow scares. People like to rely on stereotypes that validate their already held opinion more than trying to evaluate each situation on its own, by looking at data. They tend to select information sources that suit their ideological orientation and ignore other sources or contrary opinions. In a way, stereotypes are an instrument of excuses. After defining the role played by fear, we must examine more quantitative data to shed light on what creates such fears. Realism is the leading theory explaining sources of power as it mainly relies on material capabilities and relative economic and military power. Apart from neglecting the role of domestic beliefs, this may be its biggest shortcoming in view of the rising importance of soft power.. According to mainstream realism,7 countries compete with each other as they pursue their national interests in the struggle for power in anarchic international relations. The power of a state depends on what it is actually based on and the ways in which it is exercised. Seeking hegemony is therefore the result because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to acquire power at the expense of rivals. States are concerned with the accumulation of relative power as they will not be content with relative security by relying on other states (see Snyder, 2002). Such offensive realism can thus explain the emerging role of China as it aspires to obtain a more prominent role in international relations. On the other hand, defensive realism can explain the USA as it struggles to retain its current dominance, which is proving more important than increasing its power. To properly understand the rise of China today, it is essential to look beyond realism, to also consider the soft power8 which is growing in importance in a VUCA world. However, the capacity to influence others means possessing resources like population, land, natural resources, economy, armed forces, and political stability (Nye and Welch, 2014). Soft and hard power are not alternatives, but complements. In the words of Melissen, “the wheels of hard power can only function smoothly with the lubricant of soft power” (Ham, 2005). Lacking in soft power, China has started to intensively use soft power to complement its hard power based on six pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image, and economic temptation (Li and Worm, 2010). The whole story about attitudes to the leading or aspiring global players is about power and its transition. Power transition theory is in fact a version of the power balance theory, a very popular theory of international relations that interprets the causes of conflict (Haas, 1953; Sheehan, 1996; Waltz, 1979). It stems from the hierarchical nature of international relations in which the most powerful countries define the rules of the game. As rival countries acquire power, the chances of war increase (Hillebrand, 2010: 12).9 The old powers’ resistance to the erosion of their position leads us to the second group of theories, the theory of hegemon. Hegemonic stability theory (THS) argues that an asymmetric system10 is probably more stable; if one country dominates, it is a hegemon. The hegemon dominates the rules of the game and with the help of military dominance creates certain public goods in the form of security and economic stability. The erosion of this role can therefore stifle the world system and throw its stability off balance. The smaller the difference in power between the leading and rival states, the greater the likelihood of conflict (Kugler and Organski, 1989) with the upcoming forces because the incumbent power is unwilling to leave its prime position11; the so-called Thucydides trap12 (Allison, 2017). “But it doesn’t have to be« (ibid. 2017) Allison adds, although Kugler (2006) believes that China’s growing power over the USA is greatly increasing the chances of war in the next few decades. Emmott states “that the USA should not fear falling into a Thucydides trap because the historical analogy of England, Germany and WW2 is dissimilar to East Asia today. Germany overtook Britain in the 1900s, while China will not overtake the US for decades” (Emmott, 2009). According to China’s plans, this could happen upon the 100-year anniversary of their country in 2049. However, China is still far from closing the gap on all sources of power and thus the chances of war are lower. The power transition is not simply a political, geopolitical or economic problem, but a psychological one. The leading nations pride is hurt13 and it therefore attempts to block the emergence of any new power(s). The third group of relevant theories deals with different civilisation models since views are firmly embedded in the culture of the observer. Ethnocentrism is a worldview that regards Western culture and way of thinking as something extraordinary, placing it in the centre of the world14. Other cultures are viewed as different, backward, despotic-undemocratic, sometimes even barbaric or racist. It is assumed that the entire world should be modelled on Western values that are seen as universal, always correct, while others are uncivilised barbarians (see Plummer, 2010: 214). “It is about understanding the ideas and practices of another culture with the criteria of our own” (Giddens, 1997). Eurocentrism has been built on an ethnocentric ideological construct approach, locating Europe in the world’s epicentre. It interprets the history of the world as its own history. One’s identity develops on the basis of difference from others, difference in the degree of rationality; we are rational and others are irrational. The only possible conclusion is – European civilisation is superior. According to Amin, this is the ideology of the modern capitalist world (2009). Mastnak sees in Eurocentrism “a colonialist worldview, an inspiration for the European conquest and subjugation of the world and the justification of that conquest and rule” (Južnič, 2009: 183–184). The recently developed ethno-nationalism, manifested in populism and every country first policies has its roots in such theories. It also gives rise to orientalism as a view of the Middle East and, more broadly, of Eastern civilisations (Said, 1996). The mythology of enemies other than us is attributed to “sub- or inhuman ethnic and racial traits”. It is not about attitudes to individuals, but about a group of people who, as a last resort, have evil purposes attributed to them (conspiracy theory) in the sense of good versus bad. The responsibility for our own problems is shifted over to strangers (the ideology of economic nationalism), often expanding into overt populist-tinged chauvinism/racism and xenophobia. Refugees/migrants are increasingly the scapegoats for the ever worse position of those affected by technical progress and globalization (GLO), together with rising imports from China15. The populist revolt against the enormous upsurge in Chinese exports which, on top of the GLO, is seen as the biggest culprit for the lost jobs and deindustrialisation of the West. Inglehart and Norris contend this revolt is largely based on cultural, not economic factors (see Freund et al. 2017). Trump’s protectionism is also motivated by the incorrect assumption that China is to blame for the large US trade deficit.16 A chronology of fears The Red Scare The very first red scare in the USA came after the Paris Commune of 1871 while the second one followed the October Bolshevik revolution in Russia. It centred on the perceived threat of the American labour movement, anarchist revolution and political radicalism. The Third Red Scare came directly after WW2, fuelled at home by the perception of national or foreign communists infiltrating or subverting American society and, as the external factor, by the Soviet Union’s growing role in the world. A new bogeyman, ‘The Red Menace’, was portrayed as being everywhere. Communists were demonised. The Red Scare reached its peak between 1950 and 1954 during ‘McCarthyism’. The pursuit of allegedly communist infiltrators in American society had begun. Domestic communism was seen an enemy of apocalyptic proportions. When the Soviets developed an atomic bomb, fear levels intensified, just like during the Cuban crisis or when in 1957 the Soviets sent “Lajka” the dog into space on Sputnik 1. American pride was wounded then like it is now, faced with a decline in its global leadership. As a rule, such fears manifest as various conspiracy theories to make them become more tangible and more persuasive from the point of view of their generators. After the transition, Russia’s role in the world has been shrinking. Further, like all autocratic regimes, Russia should eventually transition to a marketdriven democracy (Ikenberry, 2014) meaning that it is less of a concern. Nevertheless, fear of Russia is again on the rise, mainly based on deep distrust and value-based concerns. Putin has spoken of the “offensive mistrust of the West about Russia” (Petrič, 2018: 471). American Challenge; Europe The demolished Europe, wrote J. J. Servain-Schreiber in his bestseller (1967/69), is under threat from the Americans. The USA was pictured as “enslaving” Europe, becoming an economic colony based on massive inflows of American investment funds. He believed that Europe, lagging behind the USA on all fronts (management, technology, research) was in a silent economic war. He spoke of “American attackers” in the form of US multinational companies, about the collapse of Europe. Yet Schreiber did not stop just with describing the situation. He helped revive French nationalism (similar to today’s populist movements). Later, he taught at Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, 1984–1995) and became chairman of Le Center Mondial in Paris that promoted the development of computer and information technologies. In 1985, he told President Mitterrand he was resigning because the French government had wanted to procure French equipment for France’s schools instead of buying the computers from an American corporation (see Rubner, 1990: 272). Schreiber’s intellectual honesty and consistency may thus be questioned. To conclude, these fears were also overblown. Yellow Peril I The Yellow Peril has seen two waves in the USA. The First Peril was directed against Chinese workers at the end of the 1880s. Rather than addressing the economic aspect of immigration, in 1882 anti-Asian propaganda encouraged the federal government to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act, making the immigration of Chinese labourers to the USA unlawful and preventing them from obtaining citizenship. Although this Act was repealed in 1943, anti-Asian sentiment/propaganda remained strong in the country. Later, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, it was directed at Japanese-Americans, portrayed in ways very similar to the 19th century Chinese immigrants. Yellow Peril propaganda was based on the supposedly lower intelligence or subhuman qualities of Japanese people (see White, 2019). Yellow Peril II; Japan The second wave of the Yellow Peril came in 1960 during the Japanese miracle (10.5% average GDP growth in 1950–1973). Japan’s share of world GDP had risen from 2–3 percent to 10 percent. The Japanese miracle was largely due to the creative imitation of Western technology and introduction of new production methods (lean production). Schreiber (1980) was fascinated by Japan’s automotive industry and automation, robotisation and computer science. This miracle was initially facilitated by the possibility of directing all its resources for development (Japan was not allowed to spend on the army). Second, it was due to the inventiveness and working habits of the Japanese people and the systematic strategic trade and industrial policy. The Japanese began to buy property in Manhattan and acquired American ‘jewels’ (like Rockefeller Center in Manhattan, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Columbia Pictures or the Pebble Beach Golf Course). It was predicted that Japan might already overtake the USA by GDP pc in 1985. Not surprisingly, Vogel (1979) wrote the book: Japan as Number One. This fear indeed had both economic and cultural roots given that American pride and self-confidence had been dented. The Japanese had taken the lead in sectors previously the cause of American pride (automotive industry). Still, such fears again proved to be overblown since Japan’s yellow miracle was followed by very low growth and then by the lost century. Imitation can obviously be a double-edged sword; those imitated feel threatened, while simultaneously, by wanting to have what the imitated have, the imitators themselves begin to be troubled by doubts and lose their self-respect. The French philosopher Girard says this leads to hostilities and a feeling of being endangered. Yellow Peril III: China’s Contemporary Challenge Today’s yellow peril concerns the big challenge China brings to the whole international system after its spectacular rise in the last 40 years. In less than 30 years, China had become the world’s second-largest economy by 2001. The first signs of the modern fear of China emerged in December 2004, the last month in which The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) remained in force but was set to expire by the end of the year under a World Trade Organization (WTO) decision. Developed countries soon barricaded themselves off from China and the threat of becoming flooded with its textile products. The challenge with China is underpinned by the size of its economy and by it rivalling the USA as the dominant power. China is already the world’s largest economy in population and trade-volume terms. Nominally, in 2017 China’s GDP amounted to 64 percent of US GDP. In 2014, it overtook the USA in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) to become the world’s biggest economy (Bergsten, 2018, 2). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that China will overtake the US (at 2017 market rates) in 2030 (IMF, 2018). Yet, according to the index of economic strength, China still lags 12.3 percent behind the USA. Still, as early as 2030 it may become the leading economic power, holding an 18% share while that of the USA is projected to fall (1973–2030) from 16.3 percent to 10.2 percent (Subramanian, 2011). These economic indicators should be stressed because there is a strong long-term correlation between economic capability, military power and a country’s position in the global power system. “Therefore, the hegemon (either US or China) will be in a weaker position than before /… /. It should be though remembered that, historically, China’s leading role is a natural position, since China lost its leading position by Britain only in the 19th century, and after the WW2, when US has taken over from the latter” (van Bergeijk, 2018: 15). One of the more controversial economic accusations and economic fears underlying the challenge posed by China is that it systematically imitates17 and ‘steals’ intellectual property (IP)18 and forces foreign companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies. Imitation is partly the result of admiration and resistance to Western ideas following the Century of Humiliation, the “Opium war which marked the beginning of China’s collapse and dismemberment at the hands of foreign powers” (see Davis and Rašković, 2017: 8). A fundamental goal of contemporary Chinese politics is to do all that is needed to ensure this never happens again. It nevertheless seems that this accusation is overblown. Namely, in the latest US-China Business Council Member Survey, just 5 percent of respondents reported having been asked to transfer technology to China, and this concern was ranked 24 out of the top 27 challenges facing foreign companies (Huang and Smith, 2019). At the same time, certain problematic imitation activities (trade, foreign investment, licensing, international research collaboration, reverse engineering) are legitimate and voluntary. Moreover, the situation in the area of IP rights is now changing. Premier Li Keqiang stated that “strengthening IP protection is strategic and vital for strengthening the socialist market economy” (Reuters, 2017). In view of the ambitious plans to transform China from a “large manufacturing country” into a “powerful manufacturing country” by 2025 and a “leading global producer” by 2049 (“Made in China” and plans for the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049), it may be expected that China will become a leader in many technology-driven activities. Simultaneously, the country seeks to strengthen the protection of IP not so much due to external pressures but under the internal pressure of its own companies that desire greater protection for their patents. The more domestic firms become innovative, the more they are seeking to protect their IP rights19. China is a global leader in technologies such as e-commerce, artificial intelligence, fintech, high-speed trains, renewable energy, and electric cars. Companies like Alibaba, Didi Chuxing, Huawei and Tencent are operating at the global technology frontier (World Bank, 2019: xvii). The third economic fear relates to the huge rise of Chinese investments, especially their acquisition of technology-leading companies (Godement et al., 2017). This opens the door not only to economic but political influence and creates potential for the Chinese ‘divide and rule’ policy. Public opinion is becoming more hostile (Grant and Barysch, 2008) but oscillating between “China saving Europe” and “China taking over Europe” (Shambaugh, 2013). The world fears the transfer of Chinese management patterns or values wherever their companies make investments. Past experience shows evidence of both implications; strong adaptations to local cultures (particularly in industrial countries) but also the imposition of its own management style and working habits (Africa) or a combination of these two strategies, a kind of Yin-Yang cultural approach treating different countries/firms/people differently. The EU is encountering China’s ever more aggressive policy of influencing more flexible and less critical positions in China (market economy status, democracy). The 17+1 initiative is such a strategy that could create splits within the EU, making some members the ‘fifth column’ of China in the EU. It is thus little wonder that alarm bells have started ringing over China’s ability to translate its economic power into attempts to undermine Europe’s unified policy on China. Apart from hard economic data, soft power factors should also be considered. Here, China’s position is still weak despite all the efforts it has been making in public diplomacy recently. Chinese public diplomacy these days is replacing the previous “charm offensive” strategy (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6) aimed at neutralising the “theory of threats” and improving China’s global reputation (Tai-Ting Liu, Tony, 2019: 77). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may also be regarded as an instrument of soft power. Today’s paranoia, in the face of a rapidly growing and increasingly ambitious China, is obviously principally rooted in the enormity of the Chinese economy. Second, a fear of its difference, exotics, is entailed; third, of its leading role in the world and, finally, the fear of economic intelligence, of espionage, as a threat to security. “In the name of national security, America is treating Chinese students and scholars as a new ‘yellow peril’, in a witch-hunt worthy of Senator Joseph McCarthy” (The Economist, 2019, 13 July: 52). The fear of the difference is merging with the fear of potential political interference in the economy via the large share of state-controlled firms20. The biggest distinction is therefore that China is a different civilisation, a communist, centralised and authoritarian state. It has different values and religious beliefs. The challenge brought by Chinese is thus different. Three potential scenarios arise. First, that China’s position will start to be eroded if it becomes unable to cope with the accumulated problems of its own rapid growth and the fact it has not anticipated the accompanying problems21, including all the political challenges, the necessary democratisation of the political system, and providing more human rights in the long run22. China will encounter Rodrik’s trilemma (2011) regarding how to accommodate its three pillars: GLO, sovereignty and democracy23. This scenario entails considerable internal instability and negative implications for world stability, clearly not in the interest of any of us. An international implication of such a stagnant scenario might be China adopting a more aggressive foreign policy aimed at maintaining support at home while ratcheting up repression against any signs of dissent at home. A more likely scenario is that China will take on a leading role in many areas, especially the economy, thereby beginning to change the world’s structure in either the direction of Pax Sinica or a multilateral system with China as one of the leading powers (the third scenario) in a world of cooperation and competition among the great powers. The question is whether China wishes to abolish the capitalist world order or to simply form a nonhegemonic capitalist world order in which it will have more opportunities for development. According to Hočevar (2019, 15), it seems more that “China does not undermine the capitalist world order, but rather tries to challenge the US position in the existing capitalist world order in order to form a non-hegemonistic capitalist world order”. He may be right for now, but the situation could change when China achieves a more hegemonistic position. History shows that power corrupts and aspirations can, along the way, be broadened, such as to shape the world so as to better suit its own (ideological) design (albeit the changes will be gradual). Economic success is namely enhancing China’s self-confidence, courage and opportunities to exercise its interests. It appears obvious that the US hegemony will come to an end, thereby jeopardising the stability of the system in line with the theory of hegemonic stability. The erosion of this role could thus endanger the existing global system’s functioning, throwing its stability off balance. Differences and similarities in the above perils Is there a common denominator to these fears, eclipsing popular apocalyptic literature, about dangerous aliens threatening our world, or are they more idiosyncratic? Both are correct; there are similarities and differences. Four of the most obvious similarities are as follows. The first is the fear of the growing economic size of the challengers while the second is the fear of external threats, of dangerous aliens that endanger our white world mostly because they are different and not so much because they are economically or technologically threatening. Economic concerns have gradually turned into more ideological, cultural, religious, civilisational or even racist fears. They appear as mythology regarding an enemy, someone that threatens us because they are different, which is not ours. The third group relates to the second but is ideologically based (red and yellow scare III) and the last one relates to the changing international context. The first type of fear (growing economic power) primarily relates to the American challenge to Europe after WW2, and today’s China threat also manifested in Trump’s America First policy. The Japanese yellow peril in the 1960/1970s was also economically based, but dissimilar in that the Japanese are culturally different. Among the analysed economic challenges, the biggest quantitative difference is the size and geostrategic role/ambition. Japan’s challenge in the 1970s was confined to economic/technological power (Japan’s GDP was 9 times smaller than that of the USA, whereas China’s GDP today is already 70% of US GDP). The specifics of the Chinese challenge these days, compared to the one posed by Japan, is that such economic strength is ever more combined with military and geostrategic ambitions to become the leading country in the region and (more implicitly than explicitly) in the world. The challenge China provides today is quantitatively only comparable to that of the USA when challenging Europe in the aftermath of WW2. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also competed with the USA chiefly in the ideological, military and space technology fields, but was never a serious global economic or commercial contender24. The challenge posed by China is unlike the American, red scare and Japanese challenge. China’s size is unrivalled by Russia or Japan. The Chinese shock has affected those who were already struggling to keep their jobs for other reasons while in Japan’s case US industry was better prepared (the context factor). It is also unlike them because China’s growth is extremely important for the global economy, whereas the relative consequences for the world brought by all other challengers would be significantly weaker. The challenge of China also has a geopolitical dimension in that it is becoming a military force and, in contrast to Japan, it is not an ally. China is the only military and economic rival of the USA and is hence creating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and influence (Geeraerts, 2013: 6). Based on detailed historical analysis, Subramanian notes that China’s dominance is more imminent than usually believed, will be more broadly based (covering wealth, trade, external finance, and currency), and could be as large in magnitude in the next 20 years as that of the UK in the halcyon days of the Empire or of the USA in the aftermath of World War II (2011: 4). Yet, the ‘China challenge’ has some similarities with the red one. They both used to have not only economic but also ideological roots, although the Soviet Union wanted to export socialism and China is expanding more through its economic and less through its ideological power. The second group refers to culturally-based, ideological fears, the threat of those who are exotic, because we do not know or understand them and they are ideologically different. We therefore feel threatened (USSR/Russia and China). In 1993, P. Kennedy stated that “Protectionism, anti-immigrant policies, blocking new technologies, and finding new enemies to replace Cold War foes are common reactions at a time of jolts and jars and smashes in the social life of humanity”, a view that can be applied to the current situation. Fear of this group can also be explained theoretically by the hegemonic stability and power transition theory, and eurocentrism. The third group of differences is political/ideological. While the USA, Japan and Europe share Western democratic values, China is an authoritarian socialist state, just like the Soviet Union was when it challenged the USA. However, China does not export its ideology as much as the Soviet Union did, but is first and foremost pursuing its global economic interests. By doing so, it can also indirectly pursue its ideology by spreading its soft power25 and ‘sharp power’26; for instance, by making the beneficiary states in the BRI financially dependent when they are unable to repay the large loans received for infrastructural projects within this framework (debt trap diplomacy)27. The fourth distinct factor is the changed circumstances in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and, up until recently, the strengthening of multilateralism, galloping globalisation (and de-globalisation of late), growing interdependencies and digitalisation. This is a special kind oligopolistic multilateralism, a blend of cooperation and competition between the major players that today are highly interconnected within a network of global cooperation. This power transition is occurring in a different environment, suggesting that a new cold war scenario is not very likely. Apart from the differences in all of the mentioned challenges, there are some similarities. Basically, all of the said fears: a. were based on quantitative/size factors, the rapid growth of the economies, their political and military power challenging the current system and the world hegemony, b. proved to be overblown, too dramatic, provoking paranoid panic overreactions. But nothing gets eaten as hot as it gets cooked, c. were based on ideological cultural roots, including racial, even racist prejudices28, on ethnocentrism, generating suspicions leading to eroded trust, d. were often misused for internal political battles (McCarthyism in the USA or today’s populism) and draw attention to the need to make changes in the global system’s structure and functioning and to adapt to such tectonic movements in advance, not after the event, to the transition of power underway in the global system. These fears have also caused a rethinking of certain theoretical postulates about international trade/ relations and development theories generally. This is the positive role of such fears. China is clearly the biggest challenge in the modern world. Yet, fears of a yellow peril are not new, although the forms and contexts are different, confirming Hegel when he said that history repeats itself the first time as a tragedy29 and the second time as a farce30 (Marx’s addition). These phenomena started with a red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism and later the Soviet Union (now Russia) after World War II and European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of its post WW2 reconstruction and later the fear of Japan’s spectacular technological rise. The article has described the substantial differences and similarities that exist among the challengers due to their size, political systems, ideological basis, military strength and geopolitical ambitions, and the context. The explanatory power of the different theories varies according to individual challengers; somewhere along the line, the greatest weight was given to the realist school and power transition theory based on economic/quantitative factors as a basis for their power (Japan, USA, China), or ideological/ military factors (in the case of the Soviet Union/Russia), while elsewhere they are again more ethnocentric (Japan, China). This makes a multidisciplinary approach essential because a single discipline is unable to explain such tectonic changes and ensuing reactions. All of the mentioned fears were significantly overblown by linearly extrapolating tendencies into the future, without taking account of the historical context or other factors that hampered such linear forecasts. They were conceptualised within a ‘zero-sum’ game where the rise of one power leads to the decline of another, causing inevitable conflict with the leading one and amounting to a challenge and threat to the traditional Western-led international order. Kupchan also seems right when claiming, »that the ability of great powers to impose their preferences will only decline further in the future.… The twenty-first century will not be America’s, China’s, Asia’s, or anyone else’s. It will belong to no one«. The USA will no longer be the hegemon it once was. The transformed international system should, using Rodrik words, leave greater “policy space” for national policies and sovereignty. If the great powers act wisely, neither Pax China nor Chimerica or G2 will emerge, but a multilaterally governed world in the interest of all, not just a few. This is viable if China follows, as proposed by Colonel Liu Mingfu, the example of the USA after the experience of the UK which quietly left the lead role to the USA after WW2, and not the Soviet Union example which directly clashed with the USA during the Cold War. He advocates a tolerant, long-term strategy, a century marathon31 (see Miller, 2018). In this manner, war can be side-stepped and a new model of great-power relations developed, avoiding confrontation with the USA. It seems the Beijing Consensus is unlikely to substitute the Washington Consensus in the foreseeable future. However, it holds the potential to influence countries’ development strategies. The near future will not be the same as the last century with one country leading. There could be power sharing between China, the USA, Europe/EU32 and Russia (perhaps also India) within the spirit of a ‘collaborative autonomy’ logic. Europe is not militarily strong enough but has an advantage in terms of its soft power. According to B. Emmott (2006), while China is likely to emerge as the most powerful player, it will not be sufficiently powerful to dominate but strong enough to be significant shaper of the world order. He compares China with Britain in the early 19th century when despite being more powerful it was unable to dominate. It remains unclear whether China wants superpower status. It seems that China is aware of the danger of a strategic overstretch (paraphrasing Kennedy, 1987), as an imbalance between its strategic commitments and its economic base, although it is not immune from triumphalism after abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach of making China great again.

#### The debate community avoids discussing Anti-Asian racism like the plague…

#### Asian debaters are expected to assume a restrained and calm ethos in round because their emotions are pathologized. When docility is expected, deviant behavior gets marked as too aggressive or unprofessional.

#### China has been a major part of each college resolution for the past three years, but people still can’t pronounce President Xi. Those are the same people who are the first to dock speaker points from Asian debaters for vocal inflections, tonal shifts, and accents that dance past white ears. Furthermore, every core neg argument the past four years outlined in topic papers have included iterations of Chinese deterrence that demonstrate a consistent and desired effort to make Sinophobia a stable and predictable research item.

#### As a communicative activity, debate must be held accountable for implicit, and asymmetric rhetorical protocols that maintain orientalist logics that predetermine what conversations are noted as valuable.

#### Thus, vote neg for the affirmation of transnational Asian praxis. Movements are growing and connecting at a greater rate than ever for anticolonial futures. The conglomeration of COVID, accelerating racial violence, and economic inequality put us in a unique position to break away from norms that have brought us to this present crisis. The only question is if you’re willing to not fear contamination by reaching out and grasping for a new and better future in this round.

Liu 20 (Wen, Assistant Professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at the University of Albany, “Internationalism Beyond the ‘Yellow Peril’: On the Possibility of Transnational Asian American Solidarity,” 2020, UC Santa Barbara Journal of Transnational American Studies)

In the midst of a global pandemic and social upheavals, how will transnational Asian–Black solidarity take shape? Currently living in Taipei, Taiwan, I am involved in an emergent circle of diasporic Asian radicals who write and organize around the vibrant left-leaning movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong and seek to build international solidarity based on a critique of both US and Chinese imperialism. This new activist milieu that has been described as “transnationally Asian”5 not only rejects Asian American assimilationist politics and the narrow focus of liberal international politics around democracy and human rights, but also actively seeks cross-national and cross-racial points of racial encounters and challenges the orthodox Western leftist takes on social movements that often defer to a reductionist binarism of “capitalism versus communism.” For example, a Hong Kong activist was excluded from participating in a BLM solidarity event hosted by the Sunrise Movement, an American youth–led climate organization, due to some US leftists’ Twitter commentaries that misrepresented Hong Kong’s protests against Beijing’s increasingly harsh conditions of authoritarian control as being funded by the US military. Writers from Lausan, a leftist Hong Kong press, have condemned such mischaracterization of Hong Kong’s ongoing mass movement as merely manipulated by US imperialism and, instead, insisted on the importance of building alliances between Hong Kong’s struggle against authoritarianism and BLM’s vision of police abolition.6 From this single case, one can understand that building transnational solidarity is complex and arduous work, both conceptually and practically. It requires us to maneuver from one ideological trap to another across geopolitical contexts and locally specific historical conditions. While transnational iteration is emancipatory and necessary to achieve a genuine form of Asian–Black solidarity, it must be built on a bidirectional and bifocal analysis instead of merely relying on the US-centric epistemology of what constitutes leftist politics. By seeking transnationalism from the West toward the non-West and not vice versa, it’s easy to fall into the logic of Western “China apologists” or neo-Cold War logic, dismissing the interasian conflicts that also have global ramifications. To put it in another way, as China criminalizes Hong Kong’s fight for fundamental democratic rights and implements mass arrests of young activists under the National Security Laws,7 a progressive Asian American politics must not only be focused on racial relations domestically but challenge multiple forms of Empire beyond the borders of the US. Only through this multidimensional transnational praxis can we begin to see the underlying mechanisms that allow BLM activists from Minneapolis to Seattle to adopt Hong Kong protesters’ strategies against the police. 8 These possibilities for alliance among “transnationally Asian” activists include protesters in Hong Kong and the US using umbrellas and tennis rackets to protect themselves from tear gas, the joint coalition between Taiwanese indigenous organizations and Black Lives Matter Taiwan calling out racism,9 and Singaporeans debating whether to topple their colonial monuments.10 Our current shared struggles against the rapid right-wing turn of global hegemonies do not draw lines between the simple binaries of “East vs. West,” “white vs. Black,” or “authoritarianism vs. democracy,” but underscore the interconnected fights against the militarized police state, neoliberal capitalist order, Han supremacy, and the continued impacts of Euro-American coloniality. The “yellow peril” may have been a useful metaphor describing the shared racialization of the Asian body against white supremacy and US imperialism; the politics of internationalism in the present conditions requires a much more nuanced analysis of interregional geopolitics across the transpacific. The possibility of transnational Asian American solidarity must be situated beyond the framework of “one united race against one empire.” Indeed, the fast growing infection and mortality rates of Covid-19 show that the virus cannot be simply contained by national borders, and our racial critique must also be extended transnationally. When a disease is racialized, it not only exposes the racial inequalities built in the global public health infrastructures but also how mechanisms of national security require the domination of subjects who are deemed to be “outsiders.” Rather than falling into a nationalistic blame game based on the Cold War logic—choosing sides between one empire (the US) and another (China)—the pandemic requires us to engage in the racial justice and antinativist struggles in our different localities as well as hold one another’s movements accountable to an internationalist vision of collective survival.

### 2

#### CP Text: Jach’a marka mink’ai echay qanqa di istadus unidus.

#### Red Cloud once said: “I have become tired of speaking. When I saw the treaty and all the false things in it I was mad. […] The Great Spirit will not make me suffer because I am ignorant. They will put me in a place where I will be better off than in this world.”[[6]](#footnote-6)

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

### 3

#### Plan must specify the details of antitrust reform in these four areas: 1) antitrust standards, 2) enforcement, 3) remedies, and 4) exceptions

AMC 7 (Antitrust Modernization Commission, Deborah A. Garza Chair, Jonathan R. Yarowsky Vice-Chair, Bobby R. Burchfield, W. Stephen Cannon, Dennis W. Carlton, Makan Delrahim, Jonathan M. Jacobson, Donald G. Kempf, Jr., Sanford M. Litvack, John H. Shenefield, Debra A. Valentine, John L. Warden, April, 2007, <https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf>, y2k)

The charge to this Commission has been to study, evaluate, and make recommendations for the antitrust landscape as it now exists, much changed from earlier years. The current antitrust panorama, of course, covers a broad array of issues; to study all of the possible issues would be neither efficient nor desirable. To use its resources most productively, the Commission chose to focus on four primary areas: substantive standards of antitrust law; enforcement institutions and processes; civil and criminal remedies; and statutory and other exceptions to competition (such as immunities and exemptions from the antitrust laws). The Chapters that address these issues are briefly described below.

#### Vagueness is a voting issue---causes 2AC sandbagging and kills effective implementation, which turns the case

Jones 20 (Alison Jones, Professor of Law, King's College London, Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy, 3-20, The Antitrust Bulletin. 2020;65(2):227-255. doi:10.1177/0003603X20912884, y2k)

In this article, we do not debate the condition of competition in the U.S. economy, nor do we assess the substantive merits of the respective measures proposed to correct the market and policy deficiencies identified. Instead, we focus on a less noticed issue—the policy implementation challenges that stand between the soaring reform aspirations and their effective realization in practice. We thus take the reform recommendations—presented in scholarly papers, blue-ribbon studies, and in popular essays—at face value, and ask what legislators and policy makers must do to land them. For example, assuming that more aggressive antitrust enforcement is required, how can an effective program actually be delivered—through winning antitrust cases and securing positive change—and how can it be delivered well?

In our view, these “implementation” issues have tended to be overlooked in the modern critique and to have been too quickly side-lined as technical details to be (easily) addressed once the high-level concepts of a bold antitrust program have been settled.21 Implementation is not, however, a simple matter that will necessarily sort itself out once the intellectual architecture is in place. Rather, inattention to implementation challenges invites serious disappointment by creating a chasm between elevated policy commitments and the capacity of responsible public institutions (competition agencies, new regulators, and the courts) to produce expected outcomes. This is the implementation blindside. Unless ~~the blindside~~ [the weak spot] is acknowledged and addressed, there is a significant risk that a major reform program will engage considerable resources, public and private, in initiatives that fall well short of their goals. Instead of restoring confidence in the ability of government agencies to enforce antitrust laws effectively, a failed effort might merely reinforce doubts, and cynicism, about the quality of public administration.

1. Wen Liu, ““Complicity and Resistance: Asian American Body Politics in Black Lives Matter,” October 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Will Carless, “Proud Boys Saw Wave of Contributions from Chinese Diaspora Before Capital Attack,” January 4, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/05/04/proud-boys-chinese-americans-community-support-donations/7343111002/ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Claire Jean Kim, “For Chinese American Conservatives, Race is a Weapon”, October 8 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/asian-conservatives-affirmative-action/ [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Cathy Park Hong, “Minor Feelings: An Asian American Reckoning” [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement,” December 15, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Adapted from - South Dakota Historical Collections, Volume 2. Copyrighted 1904 by Doane Robinson, Secretary, for the South Dakota State Historical Society. News Pringing Co, Aberdeen, SD. P 398 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)